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NOTES
SINGLETON ABBEY V. PALUDINA:
HUMAN WRONGDOER RULE"?-In the

A

RETURN TO THE "LAST

law of proximate cause, the

principle of Vicars v. Wilcocks' was thought to be obsolete, except,

perhaps, in cases of slander. All of the imposing list of writers who
devoted attention to this subject in recent years observed a tendency in2
the courts towards a broader view of causation in the legal sense.
The writers themselves uniformly urged extended responsibility for
negligent conduct.3 In view of this trend, a reversion to the rule
announced by Lord Ellenborough would be quite startling. Yet the
House of Lords in the recent case of Singleton Abbey v. Paludine'
declined to hold a negligent defendant responsible for injury to the
plaintiff for reasons which seemed to establish two propositions
directly in line with Vicars v. Wilcocks. Those propositions are
first, that deliberate human action taken by the plaintiff to avert a
peril to property created by the negligence of the defendant will
break the chain of causation; and second, that the negligent conduct of a third person in extricating himself or his property from
peril wrongfully created by the defendant will relieve the defendant
from liability for an injury to the plaintiff occasioned by that third
person's negligence.
The facts of the Singleton Abbey case are as follows: Three
ships, the Paludina, the Singleton Abbey, and the Sara, were
anchored side by side in a harbor, in the order named. A stiff wind
was blowing, and-because of the negligent mooring of the Paludina,
she was blown against her neighbor, the Singleton Abbey. In endeavoring to get out of this position, the Paludina was so badly
handled that she tore the Singleton Abbey loose from her moorings.
The effect of this was that the Singleton Abbey was thrown against
the third ship, Sara. The impact of this collision tore the third ship
from her moorings. About twenty minutes elapsed, and then the third
ship, the Sara, which had been struggling all this time to extricate
herself from the danger, fell down from her anchors alongside
the Singleton Abbey. During the twenty minute interval, the
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Singleton Abbey had been using her engines to prevent herself
being blown ashore. The Sara scraped along the side of the Singleton Abbey, and as she passed, came into contact with the Singleton
Abbey's propeller, breaking off the points. The holes torn in the
side of the Sara by the avenging propeller, caused her to sink. The
present action is raised by the Singleton Abbey against the Paludina,
the first ship, for the damage to the propeller. The negligence of the
Paludina was admitted. The direct issue was the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injury.
Two arguments were advanced in behalf of the defendant.
First, it was said, there is a link in the chain of causation missingand that link is to be found in the action of the master of the
Singleton Abbey. He was free, and he had steam up. He saw, and
had an opportunity for twenty minutes of realizing the position in
which the Sara was. He saw the Sara coming down upon him,
and he was told that his engines ought to be stopped; and his action
in not stopping his engines constitutes a break in the chain, even
though, as the master testified, he "kept the engines going, because he
did not want the wind to get control" of his ship. Secondly, says the
defendant, another link in the chain is missing: the chain of causation is broken by the conduct of the third ship, Sara. True, the
Sara was turned adrift by the negligence of the defendant, but
being adrift, the Sara was a free agent. The inference to be drawn
from the evidence is that her steam was up, and she could have gone
to any part of the harbor and been safe, and it cannot be said that
the chain of causation is complete when you find the Sara having
this opportunity, which, through a want of proper skill and seamanship, she did not avail herself of. The trial court found for the
plaintiff on the ground that the defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the injury. The Court of Appeal reversed this,
and the judgment of the Court of Appeal was affirmed by the House
of Lords by a vote of three to two. Four of the judges laid great
stress in their opinions on the question of the Sara's negligence
in extricating herself from a bad position. Viscount Dunedin, one
of the minority judges, found that the Sara was not negligent, -apparently assuming that had she been guilty of fault, the chain would
have been broken. Lords Sumner, Carson, and Blanesburgh held
that the Sara was negligent and that this constituted an intervening act, relieving the defendant from liability. Lords Sumner
and Carson also held that the direct and deliberate action of
the plaintiff in keeping his enginei going broke the causal chain.
The causal connection between the act done and the harm sustained is manifest. But, as Professor Bohlen has said, 5 "The proximity between the act done and the harm sustained is, however, only
one step to the determination of the final question of legal liability.
This depends also on many other principles of limitation of legal
'Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, (i9o8)
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liability which are entirely distinct from, and in no way dependent
upon, legal causal connection. Some of these have their origin in
the historical development of the law; others are based on principles
of policy; others upon an instinctive conservatism which at times
retards the growth of legal conceptions, and others are founded
upon deep-rooted fundamental principles of justice as conceived and
developed in the common law of England." In resolving the final
question of legal liability, human action which occurs in the causal
chain has always presented a difficult and perplexing problem. At
different periods in the development of the law, the different conceptions of legal liability varied the principles which determined the
effect of intervening human action, just as other principles were
varied. One of these rules of limitation existing early in the nineteenth century was the "Last Human Wrongdoer Rule",6 attributed
to the case of Vicars v. Wilcocks. In modern times, however, the
decided trend of authority has been said to make the liability of the
original actor depend upon whether or not, in view of the surrounding
circumstances, and the conditions which the defendant's conduct
may be expected to create, the subsequent human action was normal,
and so, expectable.7 In line with this, it is almost universally admitted that the mere fact that the act of a responsible human being
can be traced between the defendant's wrongful act and the injury
complained of will not absolve the defendant." Thus, instinctive acts
of the plaintiff, or a third person, done to escape a peril created by

.the defendant's misconduct, do not impose a limit to the defendant's

legal liability.9 Action of the instinct of self-preservation is expectable human conduct.
Next are volitional acts. The volitional act may be done by
the plaintiff to protect his life and limb; it may be a step taken
to protect his property; or it may be done to save another from a
peril created by the defendant's wrong. As to third persons, the
volitional act may have been induced by the defendant's negligence,
or it may have occurred independently of the defendant's wrongdoing.
With respect to the volitional acts of the plaintiff, an examination of the American authorities establishes that if the plaintiff
is in a position of peril created by the defendant's negligence, he
' This is the designation given to the broad principle deducible from Lord
Ellenborough's statement in the case of Vicars v. Wilcocks, supra note i, which
principle is, in substance, that the legal cause is the last, or nearest, culpable
human factor to be found in the chain of antecedents.
'Bohlen, op. cit supra note 5, at 504, n. 8. And see, Reese, Negligence and
Proximate Cause, (1922) 7 CORN. L. J. 95; and the language of Lord Wensleydale in Lynch v. Knight, L. R. 9 H. L. 577, 6oo (1861).
'I BzvEN, NEGIGENCE IN LAW (3d ed. 1908) 48; THOMPsON, NEGLIGENCE
(190) § 53 et seq.; and note, 36 A. S. R. (0894).
'Scott v. Shepherd, 3 W. Bl. 892 (Eng. 1772) ; Lund v. Tyngsboro, ii
Cush. 563 (Mass. 1853) ; Vallo v. Express Co., 147 Pa. 4o4, 23 Atl. 594 (892);
Jackson v. Galveston R. R., go Tex. 372, 38 S.W. 745 (0897).
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may act with some deliberation in attempting to save himself. 10 His
voluntary act does not relieve the defendant if he has acted as a
man of ordinary prudence would have acted. So, also, when a third
person's life is imperilled by the defendant's misconduct, the plaintiff's volitional act to save the other will not prevent the plaintiff's
recovering for the injuries sustained in that effort, if his act has
not been rash and imprudent." And, finally, the plaintiff may act
voluntarily and with some deliberation to save his own property
from a position of danger created by the defendant's negligence,
without absolving the defendant. 2
Before the Singleton Abbey case, the English authorities supported the same propositions. The unforeseeability of a human
force which was brought into play with the defendant's negligent
act to produce the harm was the accepted limitation on the liability
of the defendant for his wrongful conduct. In the City of Lincolu,
Lindley, L. J., declared that "reasonable human conduct is a part of
the ordinary course of things". Therefore, if the act of the original
wrongdoer has put the injured person, or it may be a third person,
into such a situation of alternative danger that it is uncertain whether
it would be better for him to act or not, his not unnatural action
in such circumstances does not break the chain of causation. 4 Express assent to this proposition was given in the Singleton Abbey
decision. However, asserts Lord Sumner, this principle includes
only danger to life and limb, and has not been extended to danger
to property. On this point it is interesting to observe Lord Sumner's
language. He says:
"As to the first [proposition], 'alternative danger' extends to
personal danger. But it has not been extended to danger to
property.
"The Paludina is liable only for the negligence causing
damage. The Singleton Abbey herself is the cause of the
damage she has suffered, not merely if her captain's action
brought it about negligently. She will be the cause of that
damage, if her captain, freely and as a direct consequence of his
own decision, brought it about at all."
" Tuttle v. Atlantic City R. R., 66 N. J. L, 327, 49 At. 450 (igoi) ; Twomley v. Railroad, 69 N. Y. i58 (18717) ; Quigley v. Canal Co., 142 Pa.388, 2r Atl.

827 (i891).

'Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1922);
Corbin v. Philadelphia, i95 Pa. 461, 45 Ati. io7o (19oo).
'Railway v. Slier, Mg Ill.
390, 82 N. E. 362 (i9o7) ; Liming v. Railroad,
81 Iowa 246, 47 N. W. 66 (89o) ; Wasmer v. D., L & W. R. R., 8o N. Y. 2i

(C88o).

" L. R. 15 P. D. 15 (0890).
v. Boyce, i Stark 492 (Eng. 1816); Adams v. Railway, L, R. 4
C. P. 739 (Eng. i869). "Alternative danger" was the convenient name given
the rule stated by Lord Ellenborough in Jones v. Boyce, supra, where he said:
"If I place a man in such a situation that he must adopt a perilous alternative,
11am responsible for the consequences."
.UJones
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And again, he says:
"I do not mean that Captain Hughes [captain of the Singleton Abbey] was negligent, but that he miscalculated his action.
Still his action was his own. No part of it was a 'natural' consequence of the Paludina's action, except in a sense that would
make negligence on his part also a natural consequence. His
action was wilful, and, though rapid, was deliberate."
Lord Sumner's position is not consistent with the authorities, nor
with reason. In The Bywell Castle5 it was held that the rule of
"alternative danger" did apply to the manipulation of ships. In that
case the defendant's negligence created a sudden peril, to avert which
the plaintiff voluntarily did an act which proved to be the wrong one.
In holding the defendant responsible, notwithstanding this, Cotton,
L. J., remarked:
"In my opinion the sound rule is that a man in charge of a
vessel is not to be held guilty of negligence, or as contributing
to an accident, if in a sudden emergency caused by the default
or negligence of another vessel, he does something which he
might under the circumstances as known to him reasonably think
proper; although those before whom the case comes for adjudication are, with a knowledge of all the facts, and with time to consider them, able to see that the course which he adopted was not
in fact the best."
Brett and James, L. JJ., concurred in this holding with similar
language. The doctrine of this case was expressly sanctioned in
two decisions in the House of Lords.'
This principle covers the
facts of the Singleton Abbey case. The Paludina's negligence placed
the plaintiff in double peril from the wind and the struggling Sara,
which forces were still operating at the time the plaintiff acted. The
question is, then, under the authority of the Bywell Castle case, was
the action of the plaintiff in keeping her engines going to avoid the
danger of the wind unreasonable? Even Lord Sumner, the most positive of the majority judges in his expressions about the plaintiff's
conduct, did not deny that the action was reasonable. He said that
it was merely a "miscalculation," and not negligence. It is this very
"miscalculation" or error of judgment which the principle of the
By well Castle case regards as expectable human action, not breaking
the chain of causation. The only apparent distinction between the
cases is that a greater length of time elapsed between the original
wrong and the plaintiff's action in the Singleton Abbey case than in
the Bywell Castle case. Even so, this ought not to vary the principle
IL R. 4 P. D. 219 (Eng. 1878).
Stoomvaart Maatschappy Nederland v. Peninsular, etc., Navigation Co.,
5 A. C. 876 (188o) ; Commissioners v. S. S. Volute, [1922] i A. C. 129.
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that the pertinent question is the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
act in view of the circumstances. Authority had, therefore, extended
the principle of "alternative danger" to perfil to property, and this
extension the Singleton Abbey case overrules.
Reason certainly would extend the application of the principle
to danger to property, had it not already been so applied. The reason
that human conduct per se does not break the chain of causation,
is because in many circumstances it is foreseeable. If, then, voluntary
action on the part of the plaintiff to protect life and limb from peril
created by the defendant's misconduct does not break the chain
because it is foreseeable, his volitional action to protect his property
under similar circumstances should be just as foreseeable. To refuse
this extension is a reactionary development, leaving a person whose
property is wrongfully endangered to act at his peril.
The second part of the Singleton Abbey decision is equally
as reactionary. A majority of the judges found that the Sara
had been negligent in extricating herself from the danger created
by the defendant, and held that this constituted the second hiatus
in the chain which the plaintiff had to establish in order to make
the defendant liable. With respect, then, to the intervening volitional acts of third persons, the American and English authorities
were quite in accord before the Singleton Abbey case. They established that the defendant's negligence may be the legal cause of
the injury, although, but for the wrongful act of a third person,
there would have been no injury. The intervening negligence of a
third person would not necessarily break the causal connection required for liability. Thus, if the defendant's wrong has created
conditions interfering with the third person's enjoyment of property
or exercise of rights, the latter's intervening negligent conduct in
removing these conditions will not free the defendant from liability
to the injured plaintiff. The most famous English case supporting
this proposition is Clark v. Chamnbers." There the defendant unlawfully placed a dangerous obstruction in the road. One who had
a right to use the road, removed the obstruction therefrom, and
negligently placed it upon the foot path, where the plaintiff was injured by it. The defendant was held liable, notwithstanding this
intervening negligence of a third person. This is a clear-cut rejection of the "Last Human Wrongdoer Rule". The third person's
action was induced by conditions which the defendant's wrong created,
and the mere fact that what the third person was induced to do was
done badly can not excuse the defendant, because "you have no right
to expect men to be more than ordinary human beings".' 8 It is
reasonably foreseeable that the acts of third persons set in motion
by the defendant's wrong might be negligent. Therefore, the chain
is unbroken.
17

L. R. 39 Q. B. Div. 327 (1878).
James, L. J., in the Bywell Castle, supra note 15.
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Previous to the Singleton Abbey decision, even the wilful act of
a third person, whose property was imperilled by the defendant's
negligence, in removing that peril whereby the harm was thrown
onto the plaintiff did not break the causal chain. This was the decision in Collins v. Commissioners.9 Burrows v. March Gas Co.2 °
went still further. There the defendant's misconduct did not in any
way affect or endanger property of the intervening third party. The
defendant negligently connected gas pipes which permitted gas to
escape and collect in the plaintiff's building. A stranger negligently
took a lighted candle to discover the outlet of the escaping gas.
The defendant was held legally responsible for the consequent explosion. The principle of the Singleton Abbey case, it is submitted,
is directly contrary to these cases. The Paludina's negligence put
the Sara in a position of danger. In struggling to extricate herself
from this situation, the Sara was negligent. Her struggles were
induced by the defendant's wrong. And if, as we have seen in
Clark v. Chambers, the negligence of a third person in removing
wrongful interferences with his enjoyment of property will not
relieve the defendant, a fortiori, the negligence of the third person in
extricating himself or his property from peril wrongfully created by
the defendant ought not to break the causal chain. The action of
the Sara is still more clearly within the principles of Cdllins v.
Commissioners and Burrows v. March Gas Co. The American
cases justly and correctly hold the defendant liable in these circumstances."
More strongly opposed to the apparent trend of the Singleton
Abbey case are those English cases which hold that even the wilful
tort," or the criminal action" of a third person will not necessarily
limit the defendant's liability for his negligence. Casual negligence
in efforts to extricate oneself or one's property from peril created
by the defendant's wrong is at least as ordinary and foreseeable human
conduct as the negligence of third persons in other action induced
by the defendant's misconduct, and certainly as ordinary and foreseeable human conduct as wilful torts and crimes which arise independently.
Just what will be the effect of the principles of the Singleton
Abbey case on the law of proximate cause is but a conjecture. With

"L. R. 4 C. P. 278

(Eng. 1869).
" L. R. 7 Exch. 96 (Eng. 1872).
'Fishburn v. Railway Co., 127 Iowa 483, lO3 N. W. 481 (i9o5) (Interference with enjoyment of property); Chambers v. Carroll, igg Pa. 371, 49
Atl. 128 (igoi) (Negligence of third person in extricating himself or property
from wrongful peril will not relieve the defendant) ; Henry v. Dennis, 93 Ind.
452 (1883) (Negligent efforts of stranger to remedy a dangerous situation created by defendant's negligence). And see, also, 36 A. S. R. 845 (1894).
'Lynch v. Nurdin, I Q. B. 29 (1841) ; Englehart v. Farrant & Co., [1897]
i Q. B. 240; Hughes v. Macfie, 2 H. & C. 744 (Eng. 1863).
' De La Bere v. Pearson, [ i9o7] i K. B. 483.
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the court looking but to the nearest wrong to limit the defendant's
liability, the case is a reversion to the rule of Vicars v. Wilcocks
in this single instance. And in the light of the previous English
decisions, it seems that the case re-establishes with full vigor, this
unjust and unreasonable principle. Reactions in the development
of the law are not unprecedented. Such influences as historical development, principles of policy, instinctive conservatism, and principles of justice, which Professor Bohlen mentions, result in a growth
of all law marked by advancements and reactions which has been
likened to the course of a pendulum, swinging between the two
extremes of standardization and flexibility.24 At the one extreme,
certainty is the predominating desire; at the other, it is justice.
These opposing aims are in conflict in particular decisions, the minor
vibrations of the pendulum, as well as in its larger movements.2 5
To apply this figure to the law of proximate cause, we find that the
course of the pendulum has been traced from a starting point of
almost absolute liability for harm done, regardless of fault, to the
opposite extreme of liability for the direct results of misconduct only,
except for intentional wrongs, and then back to the much enlarged
liability of modern times, 20 where preciseness of rule is lost almost
completely in the desire for substantial justice for the injured
plaintiff. But here in the Singleton Abbey case recurs the "Last
Human Wrongdoer Rule", a rule of certainty and of mechanical
application in the limitation of liability for negligent conduct. Whether
this reactionary decision is simply a minor vibration of the pendulum,
or a marked movement of its big swing, only subsequent cases can determine. The principal case does, however, leave the student and
the practitioner with the unsatisfactory query: What next in proximate cause?
J.A.G.

THE PENNSYLVANIA

REQUIREMENT OF

TRIAL BY JURY

IN

CRIMINAL CASES COMPARED WITH THE LAW OF OTHER JURISDIC-

judicial reasoning and judicial decisions as to the ability of an accused in a criminal trial to waive his
right to a jury, and proceed to a verdict before the judge alone, is
amply illustrated by the different views propounded on this question
by three Pennsylvania courts in deciding the case of Commonwealth
v. Hall.' By considering the reasoning of each court individually, and
TIONs-The wide divergence in

'See Isaacs, Fault and Liability, (I918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 954; and,
Isaacs, The Schools of Jurisprudence, (I918) 31 HAxv. L. REv. 373.
"Isaacs, Fault and Liability, supra note 24 at 968, n. 38, where the writer

refers to F. R. Coudert's CERTAINTY AND JUSTICE (913).
'Bohlen,

op. cit. supra note 5.

'7 Pa. D. & C. 689 (1926) ; 9i Pa. Super. 485 (1927) ; 291 Pa. 341 (1928).
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weighing its significance comparatively, the innumerable intricacies
of the problem will become manifest.
In the case of Comm onwealth v. Hall, the accused was indicted
for cutting, stabbing and wounding one X, and when called for trial,

expressly waived his right to trial by jury, and requested the court
to determine the issues of law and fact.

The presiding judge pro-

ceeded accordingly, and adjudged the accused guilty.

The prisoner

moved the court to grant a new trial, claiming that under the laws
and Constitution of Pennsylvania the court of quarter sessions

lacked authority to try the case without a jury, and that his voluntary
waiver could not confer such authority.

A new trial was refused

on the ground that the Constitution of Pennsylvania2 guaranteed
merely a right in the accused to a jury trial, and that this right, like

other guaranteed rights, could be waived.

On appeal to the Superior

Court, the decision of the lower court was reversed and a new trial
granted, primarily on the ground that a court of quarter sessions had

no jurisdiction to try a criminal case without a jury, as a jury was
an essential part of the court, and necessary to the authority of the
3
The State then appealed to the Supreme
court to decide the case.
Court for a final adjudication on the merits of this point, and that

tribunal upheld the decision of the Superior Court, but placed its
conclusion on an entirely different ground, namely, that the public
policy of the state from time immemorial has never countenanced such
procedure, and that any change in the public policy must be made
4
The learned opinions of these
by the legislature, not the courts.

'Pa. Const. 1873, Art. 5, Sec. i: "The Judicial power . . . shall be
vested in . . . courts of quarter sessions of the peace." Ibid., Art. x, Sec. 9:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to be heard by himself
and his counsel . . . and, in prosecutions by indictment or information, a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage." Ibid., Art. i, Sec. 6:
"Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof remain inviolable.....
'Porter, J. : "At common law, no court has authority to determine, without
a jury, even in the case of a petty offense, the issues of fact arising, when the
defendant pleads not guilty to an indictment, unless authority to do so is expressly conferred by statute. It has been held in states having constitutions
similar to that of Pennsylvania that a prisoner may waive his right to a jury
trial, if he chooses to do so and the legislature has conferred upon the tribunal
the jurisdiction to try cases in that manner, but the mere consent of the defendant cannot confer jurisdiction to try him upon any tribunal which has no such
jurisdiction conferred by statute."
'Moschzisker, C. J., stressed his public policy argument by showing that:
(a) The Constitution manifests such a policy. Constitution of 1873, Art. i,
Sec. 7: ". . . In all indictments for libels the jury shall have the right to
determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other
cases." The words "as in other cases" indicate a public policy to try all indictable offenses by court and jury. Art. 5, Sec. 27: "The parties, by agreement filed, may in any civil case dispense with trial by jury. . . ." This
raises an implication that such waiver cannot be made in criminal cases. (b)
Former decisions convey this intimation. Before the preceding provision was
adopted, such right was denied in a civil case. (c) Statutes passed by the
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three courts, all founded upon conflicting concepts, and widely at
variance with each other, clearly indicate the difficulties of the problem.
As this precise question arises in Pennsylvania for the first time, a
survey of the heretofore related and existing law will perhaps aid
in determining the complete status of this subject in Pennsylvania.
In an early case,5 a court of quarter sessions tried an indictable
offense at an adjourned session with a jury, when a statute provided
that no business requiring a jury should be transacted at that time.
The defendant had waived this provision, but the court, refusing to
recognize such procedure, stated that, "Jurisdiction of the offense
isn't sufficient. It must be a court of quarter sessions acting and
speaking according to law.

.

.

.

But it is not the consent of

counsel which can constitute a tribunal by which a citizen may be
tried and punished. It is the law of the land and that alone which
can constitute and establish such a tribunal." This broad language,
while often quoted in jury waiver cases, is clearly inapplicable to the
problem at hand, for the jurisdiction of the court in this early
case is clearly limited by the statute, and it is unquestionable law that
one cannot waive a mandatory statute. A few years later,, the
court considered the validity of a statute providing that those selling
liquor could be tried by a magistrate without a jury and stated that:
"There is nothing to forbid the legislature from creating a new
offense and prescribing what mode they please of ascertaining the
guilt of those who are charged with it.

.

.

.

The purpose of

the Constitution was to preserve the jury trial wherever the common
law gave it, and in all other cases to let the legislature and the people
do as their wisdom and experience might dictate." The dissimilarity
between this situation and that in the principal case is too obvious to
merit discussion, for clearly we are not now considering a new
offense created by the Legislature.
Two cases of misdemeanors tried in the county courts7 apparently established the illegality of a waiver of one juror on the
ground that twelve jurors are deemed necessary to a trial; consequently, a waiver by an accused is a nullity. These decisions may
be discounted, however, inasmuch as the decisions of the Superior
and Supreme courts, have been diametrically opposed to such a
stand. The legislature passed an act in 1861 under which one accused of a misdemeanor might be tried by a justice and six jurors,
legislature contemplate a jury trial, and to change this rule would create utter
confusion in the courts. (d) Pennsylvania will not countenance judicial legislation.
'Mills v. Commonwealth, i3 Pa. 626 (i85o).
Van Swartow v. Commonwealth, 24 Pa. 131 (1854); followed in dicta of
Commonwealth v. Andrews, 24 Pa. Super. 57 (1904). Accord: Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Pa. 89 (1862) (common law conception governs); Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 271 Pa. 378, 388, 114 Atl. 825 (192i).
"Commonwealth v. Shaw, i Pitts. 492 (1858) ; Commonwealth v. Byers, 5
Pa. Co. 295 (i888). Contra: Commonwealth v. Fritch, 9 Pa. Co. 164 (189o).
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at his option.8 The statute was held constitutional in Lavery v.
Commonwealth9 because "If trial by jury is a constitutional right,
why is it not a right that a defendant may waive? A defendant may
waive a constitutional provision in his favor." The court therefore
concluded that the statute was valid. While the language of the
court here intimates that a waiver of an entire jury was permissible,
it must be remembered that the facts of this case did not stretch to
such limits, and that in this case there was a statute authorizing such
procedure, which fact was not present in the case of Commonwealth
v. Hall. What effect these factors have will appear later.'0 The
case of Comnmnwealth v. Sweet," while following Lavery v. Connonwealth, discounted the effect of the statute and indicated that
the right to waive a juror was guaranteed by the Constitution. A
Superior Court case' 2 in which a waiver of one juror was involved,
decided that the accused merely consented to an irregularity which
did not affect the jurisdiction of the court, and therefore was embraced within the constitutional guarantee. Later, the constitutionality of a statute permitting a waiver of indictment by a grand
jury was upheld.' 3 This, of course, is a distinctly different right,
and again, there is a statute involved.
Strangely enough, a recent Supreme Court case' 4 in dictum
furnished a vague forewarning of the position the court later assumed
in the case of Comonwealtis v. Hall, but in such an inconclugive
manner as to be of negligible value. The court stated: "When there
is no constitutional or statutory nmndate, and no public policy prohibiting, an accused may waive any privilege which he is given the
right to enjoy. In the case of misdemeanors, the Supreme Court
has sustained the sentences where a voluntary waiver appeared. No
real justification for a different decision in the case of felonies, not
capital, can be supported." This indubitable and firm affirmation of
the right to waive a single juror and submit to a trial by eleven jurors,
'Act of May I, I86I, P. L. 682, 33
9 ioi Pa. 56o (188z).

PA. STAr. (West, i920) § 13101.

"The court said: ". . . but it is not consent that gives jurisdiction in
this case. It is the Act of Assembly that gives jurisdiction."
n4 Pa. Dist. 136 (1894).
The court said: "It is not sufficient to say that,
in the case of Lavery v. Commonwealth, the trial was authorized by statute. If
a verdict by less than twelve, even when consented to, is a violation of a right
guaranteed by the Constitution, it will require something more effective than an
Act of Assembly to overcome the objection to it and make it regular. The decision must be based upon the theory that the constitutional right may be
waived; otherwise, it cannot be defended."
Commonwealth v. Beard, 48 Pa. Super. 319 (I91x).
'Commonwealth v. Francies, 250 Pa. 496, 95 Atl. 527 (915).
"Commonwealth v. Eagan, 281 Pa. 251, 126 Atl. 488 (1924) (Waiver of
one juror).

Italics the writer's.

NOTES

settles any question in Pennsylvania as to this particular right.15
Before the adoption of the Constitution of 1873, which provided
for the first time in Pennsylvania that a jury trial in civil cases may
be waived, a case 6 arose which raised the question as to whether
this privilege existed under the previous constitution. The court decided that such a trial was not "in due course of law." This is the
only previously decided case in Pennsylvania involving a waiver of
an entire jury and must, therefore be accorded its due significance,
for if a waiver was impossible in a civil case, it.is a foregone conclusion that the same result would be reached in a criminal action.
The unique significance of this study of Pennsylvania decisions
lies in the realization that up until the case of Commonwealth v. Hall,
no Pennsylvania court had judicially considered the question of
waiving an entire jury in a criminal case. Dicta might have implied
such an extension of the foregoing principles, but nothing specific
had been said. Certainty, however, lay in the fact that the court
was logically committed to the proposition that if the right existed,
it applied equally to misdemeanors and felonies. A strong indication
of the persuasive effect of legislative sanction on this procedure also
appears. With this fundamental concept of the Pennsylvania policy,
it is possible further to analyze the precise problem that confronted
the court in Commonwealth v. Hall.
There are two types of constitutional provisions regarding jury
trials in criminal cases; the one mandatory 17 and the other permissive.' 8 The former may be disregarded for the purposes of this study,
for no problem of interpretation arises where the language clearly
commands that all criminal cases be tried by jury. 9 The balance of
this note, therefore, is confined to a consideration of jury waiver
problems as construed under constitutions guaranteeing the "right"
to a jury trial. The decisions in other jurisdictions are employed to
aid in clarifying and discriminating between the views of the three
Pennsylvania courts which duly considered the case of Colmmonwealth v. Hall.
The judge presiding in the quarter sessions court interpreted
the Constitution as guaranteeing merely a personal right in the accused to a trial by jury, as contradistinguished from an absolute
'Accord: State v. Kauffman, 51 Iowa 578, 2 N. W. _75 (1879); Commonwealth v. Dailey, 66 Mass. 80 (1853) ; State v. Sackett, 39 Minn. 69, 38 N.
W. 773 (1888) ; State v. Baer, 1O3 Ohio St. 585, 134 N. E. 786 (921).
Contra:
N. Y. v. Cancemi, 18 N. Y. 128 (i858) ; State v. Rogers 162 N. C. 656, 78 S.
E. 293 (1913)."
Gwynn v. O'Hern, 72 Pa. 29 (1872).
ITU. S. Const., Art. 3, Sec. 2: "The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment shall be by Jury."
"Pa. Constitution, supra note 2. These provisions are similar to those in
most states.
"In re Virch, 5 Alaska 5oo (1916); N. Y. v. Cancemi, supra note I5;
State v. Rogers, supra note 15.
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guarantee of a trial by jury, and maintained that no question of jurisdiction was involved. An early Minnesota case20 firmly supports this
view. The language of a subsequent decision 2' aptly bares the difficulty in stating that "We may say that it seems to us that perhaps
the true criterion is whether the right is a privilege intended merely
for the benefit of the defendant, or whether it is one which also

affects the public or goes to the jurisdiction of the court.
The language imports merely a grant or guaranty of a right to
the accused for his own protection, and seems to us never to have
been intended to prescribe the organization of the court, or to make
a jury an essential part of it.
If this be so, it necessarily follows
that the presence or absence of a jury is not a jurisdictional matter,
-that is, it does not go to the constitutional organization of the court."
State v. Baer,12 recognized as a leading case on the subject, also adheres to this view.

Some courts use language indicating that a statute is necessary
to confer jurisdiction on the court,23 while other cases almost unanimously indicate that a state statute existed on the subject when the

decision was made. Undoubtedly, the language of the Constitution
implies a purely personal right in the accused, and it is difficult to
see why the courts should not permit him to exercise the right guar24
Still, some judicial bodies
anteed to him by the Constitution.
lucidly support the opinion and reasoning of the Superior Court in
holding that a jury is an essential part of the court which vitally affects a court's jurisdictiof over a criminal case. It would seem to
be anomalous to hold that the constitution confers a privilege on an
accused to have or waive a jury trial, and at the same time nullify

' State v. Sackett, supra note I5.
=State v. Woodling, 53 Minn. 142, 54 N. W. io68 (1893) (misdemeanor).
Accord: Murphy v. State, 97 Ind. 579 (1884) (felonies and misdemeanors) ;
Louisiana v. White, 33 La. Ann. 1218 (188i) (misdemeanor) ; State v. Cottrill, 31 W. Va. 162, 6 S. E. 428 (1888) (misdemeanor) ; State v. Alderton, 5o
W. Va. IOI, 40 S. E. 350 (19Ol) (misdemeanor); In re Staff, 63 Wis. 285, 23
N. W. 587 (1885) (felony).
' Supra note 15. The reasons for the court's decision are: (a) The constitution is not mandatory. (b) The deprivation of a right is .an irregularity
and not a jurisdictional question. (c) Contracts are sacred and a criminal is
entitled to no additional protection. (d) There is no disadvantage to the accused. (e) It is discretionary with the accused and the state need not force a
right upon him. (f) Analogy that a plea of guilty is a waiver. (g) The
tendency is away from technicalities.
' State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349 (1878) (felony).
'Harris v. People, 128 Ill. 585, 21 N. E. 563 (i88g): "Trial without a
jury in a felony is unknown to the common law." Paulsen v. People, 195 Ill.
507, 63 N. E. 144 (igo2) : "At common law a jury was an essential part of
any court which had jurisdiction to try persons charged by indictment, and in
the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions, is an essential part of any
tribunal empowered to try offenses presentable only on indictment found by a
grand jury." Accord: Commonwealth v. Rowe, 257 Mass. 172, 153 N. E. 537

(1926).

NOTES

its effect by decreeing that a court has no jurisdiction to decide a
case where the right is exercised. On the other hand, it must in
all fairness be conceded that the constitutional provision empowering
the courts of quarter sessions makes no specific provision for the
organization of the court, and it is readily conceivable that the common law conception may govern.25 However, after a review of the
authorities on the question, it seems unconvincing to maintain that
it was intended by the framers of the Constitution to create the
above-mentioned anomaly. Since the language of the constitutional
provision clearly confers the "right", it would seem to follow as a
natural consequence that when he exercised the right in the tribunal
provided by the Constitution, that body was intended to have the
necessary jurisdiction to enforce it.
This literal interpretation of the Constitution was the precise
point of conflict between the court of quarter sessions and the Superior Court. The Supreme Court attacked the problem from a
broad, statesmanlike angle, and decided the case within the limitless
realm of public policy.26 The investigation of this court unearthed
a policy in the state existing from time immemorial to have a jury
decide issues of fact in all criminal trials, as evidenced by inferences
from other constitutional provisions, and the language of previous
court decisions and legislative statutes. The practical difficulty of
overthrowing a vast, established body of law founded on the concept
that a jury was an integral part of a criminal court, and the resulting
confusion, were given proper consideration, while the settled
policy of the court precluded any attempt at judicial legislation. It
would seem that the reasoning of public policy is simply an indirect
manner of stating that the right is one that adheres primarily to the
state, rather than considering it as a privilege purely personal and
vested in the individual. Such an interpretation is opposed to the
usual interpretation placed on these constitutional provisions, and
recognized by the Supreme Court in its opinion.
Another difficulty arises when it is remembered that in Pennsylvania today a waiver of one juror is constitutional, 2T while a waiver
of an entire jury is unconstitutional. Isn't the latter an extension
of the former? Why doesn't the public policy of the state also forbid
a waiver of one juror? These questions immediately arise in the
legal mind, and are explained by the court on the reasoning that when
one juror is waived, a lay body still officiates as a jury separate and
distinct from the court, while such a situation doesn't exist where
the entire jury is waived. This distinction, while valid, presents
"I
CHITrY, CRIMINAL LAW (3d Am. ed. 1836) 5o5: "The petit jury when
sworn, must consist precisely of twelve, and is never to be either more or less
on the trial of the general issue." See Note, (igo8) 57 U. OF PA. L. REv. 32.
' Cancemi v. People, supra note 15; Territory v. Ah Wah, 4 Mont. 149
(i88r). For a criticism of the public policy theory, see Oppenheirn, Waiver of
Juryv Trial in Criminal Cases, (1927) 25 Micii. L REv. 695.
"e WHITE, CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA (2d ed. i907) § 12.
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28
difficulty when we adhere to the common law conception of a jury,
namely, one comprised of twelve men. However, statutes may be
found in Pennsylvania permitting juries of less than twelve in
certain offenses, and it is conceivable that this factor influenced the
courts and led to a logical extension of the doctrine to include all
misdemeanors and felonies. Naturally, a statute is a legislative interpretation of the public policy of the state.
A third difficulty is found in the fact that practically all the
states permitting waivers do so because of the presence of a statute,
although there are some dicta contrary.29 It is submitted that if the
Constitution does not confer the right of waiver, surely the legislature cannot change the Constitution by statute.30 Again, we may
find justification for this view on the ground that the legislature
simply confers authority on the court so to act,8 ' without affecting
the constitutional rights of the accused, or that the legislature has
changed the public policy of the state.
It is interesting to speculate as to what course the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania will follow when confronted with the problem
of the constitutionality of a statute conferring a right upon an accused to waive a jury trial in a criminal case, inasmuch as both the
Superior and Supreme Courts failed to prognosticate their future
position should such a question arise. There seems to be a fair
probability that such an enactment would be declared constitutional
on the theory that the legislature had changed the public policy of
the state, and thus removed the objection propounded by the Supreme
Court in Commonwealth v. Hall. If public policy is sufficiently
strong to prevent a literal interpretation and enforcement of a right
guaranteed by the Constitution, surely a change in policy will be equally
effective to permit its exercise, without infringing upon the pro32
visions of the Constitution. Many jurisdictions have so decided.
As to the objection of the Superior Court that a court of quarter
sessions has no jurisdiction to try a case without a jury, it may be
answered that the statute would confer jurisdiction under the constitutional authority of the legislature to create new courts.88 Such
a position has also been upheld.84 Moreover, a definite theory of
construction exists which endeavors to construe constitutional provisions and statutes together harmoniously, unless a clear-cut conflict

" See note 25, supra.
'State v. Baer, supra note i-.
"This was recognized in Commonwealth v. Sweet, supra note IO.
'Cases, supra note 24.
' See Murphy v. State, Louisiana v. White, State v. Woodling, In re
Staff, all supra note 21 Edwards v. State, 45 N. J. L, 419 (1883). For effect
of statute forbidding waiver, see Harris v. People, Commonwealth v. Rowe,
both supra note 24.
u Pa. Const. 1873, Art. 5, Sec. i.
u State v. Worden, supra note 23.
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appears.85

To this may be added the consideration that the courts

would also evaluate the practical expediency of such a statute in relieving congestion in the courts by speeding the trial of criminal cases,
as well as the justifiable advantage to be gained in denying a
criminal the right to reverse his position, and maintain that his
voluntary waiver was void and unconstitutional. For these reasons,
together with the factor that such statutes under like constitutions,
have been uniformly upheld by other jurisdictions, it would seem
that the Supreme Court not only would, but should uphold the constitutionality of such a statute.
Regardless of the above difficulties, the law is now well settled
in Pennsylvania that a waiver of one juror is constitutional in all
crimes except those involving capital punishment, while a waiver of an
entire jury renders the trial a nullity.88 Any change, in the interests
of expediency and progress, must, as the Supreme Court indicated,
come from the legislature or a constitutional amendment. 87
G.M.
DEPOSIT IN -A CORRESPONDENT BANK AS AN EQUITABLE AsSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF DRAwERS-The increasing impor-

tance of international trade has resulted in numerous bankig transactions having for their purpose the payment of debts through transfers of credit. Many precedents have been established, fixing the
rights of the parties in each situation presented for adjudication. The
legal status of many other transactions as yet remains unsettled.
Such a precedent was established in Equitable Trust Co. v. First
National Bank,' a precedent which seems destined to discourage the
particular type of transaction involved in that case.
The A firm, New York bankers, offered service to small banks
in the United States that wished to draw upon foreign banks
listed among the correspondents of the A company. In return for
funds paid to them, these New York bankers promised that they
would "promptly forward our advice of the same and provide the
drawee with funds sufficient for the payment of the draft abroad,
by a transfer of credit from our balance, or otherwise." A represented
itself as acting merely as agent of the drawers in this transaction.
35I

Bisnop, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
MoscazIsxER, TRIAL BY JuRy (1922)

(4th ed. 1895) § 893.
§§ 398-403.

'For a further analysis and discussion of state statutes allowing a waiver
in all cases, see (1927) 7 BOSTON U. L. REV. 62; (I912) 12 Co.. L. REv. 163; 25
MICH. I REv., supra note 26; Bond, The Maryland Practice of Allo ing Defendants in Criminal Cases to Choose a Trial Before a Iudge or a Jury Trial,
(i92i) 6 MAss. L. Q. 89; (1925) 3 Wis. L. REv. 187; 48 A. L. R. 767 et seq.
(1926); (1925) I A. B. A. JouiL 699.
'48 Sup. Ct. 167 (928),
A. 2d, 1926).

reversing In re Gubelman, 13 F. (2d) 732 (C. C.
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A Colorado bank, B, intending to utilize the service offered by A,
executed a draft on the C bank of Italy. The draft was sold and
notice was sent to A, in which it was stated that we "shall thank
you to protect same upon presentation." A check was enclosed to
cover the draft and to compensate A for its services.
This draft was listed with others sent by A to the C bank with
a request to "honor the above listed drafts, charging same to our
account". When received by C, in accordance with- its custom the
account of A was debited with the total amount and an account
termed "Drafts Payable" was credited. The funds in that account,
representing outstanding drafts ordered paid by C's correspondents,
drew no interest; in this manner the C bank gained its compensation.
Before the holder of the draft presented it to C, the petition
in bankruptcy of A had been filed. The draft was dishonored by
C, and B, as drawer, paid it. B's claim to priority was contested
by the trustee in bankruptcy.
The first ground on which B's claim was based was that the
sum paid by B to the bankrupt was upon a trust to be applied to the
draft. This contention received little consideration in either the
Circuit Court or the Supreme Court, since no specific res nor any
intention to maintain the identity of the fund could be established.
The second ground was that the transaction accomplished an
equitable assignment of A's credits in the possession of C, to which,
by subrogation, B was entitled. This contention was upheld by the
the Circuit Court. The decision was reversed in the Supreme Court,
the opinion of the majority being delivered by Mr. Justice Holmes.
A dissenting opinion was written by Mr. Justice Stone, in which
dissent Mr. Justice McReynolds joined.
According to the view which prevailed in the Supreme Court,
B failed to establish the presence of two elements essential to
proving the existence of an equitable assignment. Insufficient evidence was introduced to convince the majority that A intended to
make an equitable assignment,2 nor was that group satisfied that A
had relinquished control 3 of the funds transferred to the "Drafts
Payable" account. The dissenting opinion supports the opposite
23 PomERoy, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1905) § 1235: "Every express executory agreement in writing, whereby the contracting party sufficiently
indicates an intention to make some particular pyoperty, real or personal, or
fund, therein described or identified, a security for a debt or other obligation,
or whereby the party pomises to convey or assign or transfer the property as
security creates an equitable lien upon the property so indicated, which is enforceable against the property in the hands not only of the original contractor,
but of his heirs, administrators, executors, voluntary assignees and purchasers
or encumbrancers with notice." Quoted in Walker v. Brown, 165 U. S. 654,

664 (1896).

' Christmas v. Russell, i4 Wall. 69 (U. S. 187) ; Donovan v. Middlebrook,
95 N. Y. App. Div. 365, 88 N. Y. Supp. 6o7 (iqo4); Wood's Estate, 243 Pa.
211, 89 Atl. 975 (914).

NOTES
view, asserting that both these elements were present. The difference
of opinion in regard to the element of A's intention to assign arises
from varying constructions placed on the language and circumstances
surrounding the contract between A and B in addition to the course
of dealing between A and C; that difference in regard to the element of A's control of the fund while credited to the "Drafts
Payable" account originates in opposing views- as to the proof, by
the trustee, of a practice in international banking. 4 An examination
of the facts would seem to justify the conclusion that there is substantial reason for the difference of construction placed upon them.
Even if the practice in international banking, giving a right
to control to A, had been successfully established, the dissenting
opinion takes the position that, as a matter of law, the control could
not be exercised. It is asserted that A was legally incapable of
exercising control over the funds in the "Drafts Payable" account,
since such an action would be a violation of the contract with B.
Mr. Justice Stone also expresses the opinion that if A, acting contrary to his responsibilities to B, were to attempt to exercise control over the fund in the possession of C, the latter would be bound
to prevent A from exercising such control. The principle supporting
this conclusion is that "a bank of deposit may not, with impunity,
ignore the known equitable rights of others to the credit established
by its depositor." 5

' Mr. Justice Holmes: "In accordance with the practice in international

banking, the bankrupts when they saw fit to do so, cancelled their advices and
were recredited in their general account; and although, in fact they did not
cancel the advice of inland drafts except when requested by the inland banks,
the Italian bank [C] did not know or inquire into reasons."
Mr. Justice Stone took the view that the evidence failed to establish "a
practice or custom, or any rule of Italian law, permitting the depositor while
the drafts were outstanding to cancel or control for his own purposes, the
credit set apart for their payment"
'National Bank v. Insurance Co., 104 U. S. 54 (1887), was cited in support
of this principle. There an insurance agent maintained an account in a bank under his own name followed by the word "agent." Collections made by him for
his principal, the company, were deposited in that account, and checks for the
amount due the company were periodically drawn against it. The bank, being
aware of this course of dealing made a loan to the agent. The remittances
from the agent having been discontinued, the principal claimed the funds in
the bank through a bill in equity. The bank defended contending that it held
the fund to cover the indebtedness of the agent to the bank. A decree was
entered for the insurance company on the ground that this was a trust fund,
held for the company, of which fact the bank had notice. This case can
scarcely support the principle for which it was cited; that principle would seem
to impose on the bank a duty to investigate the application of any funds drawn
by a trustee or agent from an ordinary checking account, on penalty of liability
to the cestui que trust if the trustee absconds or misapplies the funds. In
addition, both the principle and National Bank v. Insurance Co. presuppose an
existing equitable interest in a third party; in Equitable Trust Co. v. First
National Bank, the effort is to determine what A and C might do in regard to
the credits in the "Drafts Payable" fund, so that it may be decided whether
there is an equitable right in B.
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No direct precedent governing this case has been found. There
are, however, several somewhat analogous situations in which the
rights of the parties are definitely fixed.
The drawee, C, has adopted a procedure quite similar to that
employed by a bank in certifying a check. In each case the amount
of the check or draft is deducted immediately from the depositor's
account and credited to an account maintained by the bank for that
purpose. Such a course of action by the bank, when done in certifying a check, implies that the check is drawn on sufficient funds
in the drawee's possession, that those funds have been set apart for
its payment, and that they will be thus applied when the check is
presented for that purpose.7 A, by notifying C to pay the draft,
knowingly set in motion this exact procedure on the part of C. In
so doing, it seems justifiable to infer that A intended to participate
in a transaction raising quite similar implications. It is obvious
that these implications, when raised in the case of certified checks,
would establish an equitable assignment, were not the remedy at law
on an acceptance of the bill of exchange entirely adequate.8
The close similarity between the situation in the principal case
and a transaction in which the rights of the parties are well established may be illustrated by a hypothetical case. Suppose that
B had bought the draft of A on C. A, having specific funds in the
possession of C, orders C to honor the draft. C assents. B negotiates the draft, and it is presented by the holder to C. It is dirhonored, A having filed a petition in bankruptcy. The holder recovers
from B on his endorsement. B and A's trustee in bankruptcy claim
the fund in the possession of C.
From the business point of view of the parties involved the situations in the hypothetical case and in Equitable Trust Co. v. First
National Bank are identical. All elements, including the intention
of the parties, would seem to run parallel in the two cases. Viewed
as possible equitable assignments, the hypothetical case seems the
weaker of the two. In the principal case there is the added factor of
the removal of the fund from the personal account of A. This fact
would seem to make more probable an intention of A to have the fund
appropriated, since A was aware that the order to honor the draft
would result in such a transfer. In addition, it would appear that
A exercised greater control over the fund while it remained in his
own account, in the hypothetical case, than when it had been transferred to the "Drafts Payable" account in the principal case. Yet
'Poess v. Twelfth Ward Bank, 43 N. Y. Misc. 45, 86 N. Y. Supp. 857
(Sup. Ct. 1904).

'Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati, 18 Wall. 604 (U. S. 1873) ; Goshen National
Bank v. Bingham, 118 N. Y. 349, 23 N. E. iSo x89o); Central Guarantee Co.
v. White, 2o6 Pa. 6x, 56 Ati. 76 (19o3).
'Compare the implications raised above by the certification of a check
with the elements of an equitable assignment, .supra note 2, and 3 PomEuoy,
EQUITy JURSPRuDENcE (3d ed. igoS) § 128o.
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it is a generally accepted principle that, in the hypothetical situation,
as between the drawer and the payee, and after notice to the drawee
as against creditors of the drawer, such an order will operate as an
equitable assignment of part of the fundY
Examined from the viewpoint of the settled rules of equity, there
would appear to be more than a slight foundation to B's claim to
priority. In dealing with a petitioner having a substantial claim to
classification within a group universally recognized to possess equitable remedies, the court seems totally justified in considering questions of public policy and business convenience in arriving at a conclusion.
Mr. Justice Stone presents strong considerations of policy and
convenience in support of his view:
"Both parties to this transaction knew that American drafts
drawn on European banks would be worthless unless definite
arrangement for their payment by the drawee was made in advance of their presentation, and that where, as here, a particular credit was set apart for that purpose the utility of such
drafts would be seriously impaired if the credit, once established,
could be cancelled at will. No intelligent banker would sell drafts
if the establishment of such a credit were not contemplated. A
bank here, drawing and selling such drafts against a credit to
be established abroad by others, pledges its own credit to the
payee and is secured against loss and the dishonor of its drafts
only in so far as it may insure the creation of the appropriate
credit and retain the benefit of it once it is created. The stipulation that the bankrupts should promptly set apart a credit for
that purpose upon receipt of advice of the draft and advise the
drawee of it was a material inducement to petitioner to pledge
its own credit by the sale of its draft. Once performed it is
valuable security to both payee and drawer, if it is permitted
to have the legal sanctions which ordinarily attach to agreements
of this character."
It is probable that the decision in the principal case will result
in many banks abandoning the course followed in this transaction.
The same transaction, from a business point of view, will be accomplished in a less hazardous manner, possibly by means of a specific
statement in the contract of the parties' intention to make an equitable
assignment, or by means of the procedure suggested in the hypothetical case. It is also probable that others will be penalized, as was
B, for not knowing how far their equitable remedies extended. This is
'Fortier v. Delgado & Co., 122 Fed. 6o4 (C. C. A. 5th, i9o3); In re
Hanna io5 Fed. 587 (E. D. Pa. igoo). For other cases, see 5 C. J. 927, n. 87.
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essentially a banking, not a legal problem. Despite that fact, it is
submitted, in the words of the dissenting opinion, that a recognition
of the equitable lien of B would "make effective the intention of the
parties and give stability to a large and important class of banking
transactions."
J.L.D.

THE PRINCIPAL OFFICE RULE AS A PREREQUISITE TO ADMISa recent decision, the

SION TO PRACTICE IN A LOCAL COURT-In

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has clearly defined its position in
respect to the power of courts to make rules regulating the admission of attorneys to practice.1 An attorney presented with his application to practice in the courts of Delaware County, the certificate
of his admission to the Supreme Court. He qualified in every way
but one. He refused to swear that he intended to make his principal
office in that county, as required by a local rule of court. ' On appeal
to the Supreme Court, this rule was held valid as a reasonable means
of expediting the business of the lower court.
At the present time there is no conflict between the rule of the
court, and the act of the legislature on admission to the bar, because
the statute provides that the certificate of admission to the Supreme
Court shall qualify an attorney to admission to the other courts of
3
But
the state only "upon approval of the local examining board."
in the past there was a conflict between the rules of the judiciary and
of the legislature. In 1887 an act was declared unconstitutional which
had attempted to make the certificate of the Supreme Court operate
automatically as an admission to all courts in the state.' And in
i909 a similar act was declared constitutional only after the Supreme
Court had approved its operation in a restricted sense, and had pointed
out that there were certain functions of the court in respect to admission to practice with which the legislature could not interfere. 5
The opinion of the principal case again shows the limit beyond
which the courts will not go in their effort to prevent friction between
the various branches of the government. It is said that "statutes
dealing with admission to the bar will be judicially recognized as valid
so far as the legislation does not encroach on the rights of the
courts to say who shall be privileged to practice before them, and
under what circumstances a person shall be admitted, and no farther."
On the question of the respective power of the judiciary and the
legislature to prescribe rules for admission to practice, decisions in the
United States fall into three broad groups. A minority of courts puts
Motion, Pa. Sup. Ct., decided January 30, 1928.
'Olmsted's
2
C. P. Delaware Co. Rules, p. 30, § 7.
'Act of July II, 3923, P. L. io6g, § I, PA. STAT. (West, 392o) § 853.
Splane's Petition, 123 Pa. 527, 16 Atl. 481 (1889).
'Hoopes v. Bradshaw, 231 Pa. 485, 49o; 8o Atl. iog8 (I9II).
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the principal power in the legislature, and leaves only the enforcement
of such rules in the judiciary.6 In one state this position can be explained by its constitution.7 The extreme oppdsing view is that
the subject of admissions is for the judiciary alone." The third group,
into which Pennsylvania falls, respects reasonable legislative action,
although asserting ultimate control to be in the judiciary., One
foundation of the last two views is in the history of barristers in
England, where admission is in control of the Inns of Court.'0 Another
basis is the inherent power of the judiciary over attorneys, caused
by the nature of our governments which are separated into the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, each equal in its sphere. 1
In Pennsylvania the effect of the Supreme Court certificate of
admission upon lower courts is now limited by the principal case to
exclude the necessity of examination of the applicant as to the law,
and of his character up to the time of admission. But a lower court
may question an applicant's moral character since admission, or refuse
to allow him to practice if such "court certifies of record either to
believe the Supreme Court was misled as to the candidate's real
character, or other good and sufficient reasons why he should not be
enrolled as a member of the local bar."
The question of the reasonableness of the principal office rule
does not appear to have arisen in other states. This can be explained by the fact that in most states the legislature, or the highest
courts, have created one bar for all courts.' 2 Peviously in Pennsylvania a rule of a similar nature has been upheld.' 3 Further, while
most lower courts in Pennsylvania have no such rule, several have
requirements similar in character to the one in question." The
' Anderson v. Colin, 27 Idaho 334, 339, 147 Pac. 286 (1915) ; In re Applicants for License to Practice Law, 143 N. C. 1, 55 S. E. 635 (i9o6). For complete annotation of case see io L. R. A. (N. s.) 288 (19o7). In New Jersey the
power of appointment is in the governor. In re Hahn, 85 N. J. Eq. 5io, 96

Aft. 589 (19r5).

'ln re Cooper, 22 N. Y. 67 (I860).
"In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646 (1899).
'In re Bailey, 248 Pac. 29 (Ariz. 1926) ; In re Chappelle, 46 Cal. App. Div.
383, 234 Pac. 9o6 (1925), annotated in (925) 13 CAL. L. Rrv. 271; In re
Goodell, 39 Wis. 232 (1876).
" See Green, The Court's Power over Admissions and Disbarment, (1925)
4 TEX. L REv. 1, 6.
'In

re Day, supra note 8.

' In re Dellenbaugh and Burke, 17 Ohio C. C. io6 (1899); State v.
Moscher, 28 Iowa 82, 1o3 N. W. io5 (19o5); MAss. GEN. LAws (192i) 2382.
"Byrne's Account, 17 Pa. Dist. 427 (igo8). But see Mantin v. Travellers
Ins. Co., 25 Pa. Dist. 455 (ii6).
" C. P. Dauphin Co. Rule 20 (Residence); C. P. Franklin Co. Rule 50
(Residence and 6 months local clerkship); C. P. Montgomery Co. Rule 31
(Principal office requirement) ; C. P. York Co. Rule 56 (6 months local clerkship). The courts of Philadelphia County have no such rule.
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avowed purpose of the rule is to end delays caused by the preference
which Philadelphia lawyers give to court engagements in Philadelphia courts over those in Delaware County courts. But rather it
would seem to be an attempt to create a monopoly for the members
of the county bar. It has been much criticized on the grounds that
it is unfair to Philadelphia lawyers, many of whose clients have
estates in Delaware County, that it is unprogressive, and that the
difficulty could be satisfactorily obviated by restricting the granting
of continuances.
L.M.C.S.

